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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TUONGXUANDANG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010739-CA 
Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Attempted False 
Evidence of Title and Registration, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) and Utah Code Ann. § 41-U-1315 (1998), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Judge, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
(1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Whether the trial court exceeded its authority prescribed by law when it 
imposed restitution upon Appellant for acts that he neither pled, admitted to, or agreed to 
pay for, and which bore no direct link to his behavior. 
Standard of Review: "Unless a trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law 
or abuses its discretion, [an appellate court] will not disturb its order of restitution." 
State v. TwitchelL 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Tuong Xuan Dang's ("Mr. Dang") challenge to the restitution order is 
preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 58 (August 8, 2001 Sentencing Hearing). 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2001), Utah's restitution statute, is 
determinative of the issue on appeal. It's text is provided in full in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Mr. Dang was charged by information with one count of false evidence of title 
and registration, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1 a-1315 
(1998), and one count of theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404(1999). R.l-2. An arrest warrant issued. R.3 
Mr. Dang pled no contest to one amended count of attempted falsification of title 
and registration, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-10 land 
41 -1 a-1315. R.26. After a restitution hearing, he was ordered to pay the victim's 
insurance company $5977.81 for her totaled van, and $1475.00 to the victim to cover her 
deductible, a $201 van headliner, and insurance premiums that she paid while the van 
was in Mr. Dang's van customizing shop. R.35-38, 58. Mr. Dang appeals from the 
restitution order. R.47-48. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In November, 1998, Christie Blatnick ("Ms. Blatnick") took her van to Mr. Dang's 
van customizing shop to be painted. R.58[7,21]. They agreed on a price of $500 for the 
paint job. R.58[7,16]. The rest of the facts concerning the deal are in dispute. 
According to Blatnick, she took her van to Dang to be painted. R.58[7]. They 
agreed on a price of $500. IcL_ When the job was done, she went to retrieve the van in 
December, 1998. IcL Dang presented her with a bill for $4000 or $5000 from a company 
called KV Auto Body. LI Blatnick testified that she never hired or authorized KV to do 
the paint job. Id 
A dispute ensued over the actual cost of the work, as well as over the extent of 
work that Blatnick requested. R.58[8]. Dang claimed that he did additional body work 
on the van at Blatnickfs request. Id. Blatnick testified that the body work was done 
before she took the van in to be painted. IcL. Dang refused to release the van until she 
paid for all the work he did. IcL. She called the police, who brokered an agreement 
whereby Blatnick would pay $500 and she could take possession of the van until the 
dispute was settled. IcL 
Blatnick took the van with her that day. IcL She returned it in January, 1999, so 
that Dang could do some touch-up work on the paint job, plus some additional work that 
she asked him to do prior to the paint job. Id. She did not give Dang any additional 
money. R.58[9]. She did purchase some headliner material from Dang for $201. 
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R.58[32]. 
Blatnick called every three or four weeks to check on the progress of the van. IcL 
She finally went back to Dang's shop in January, 2000, with the title to the van to claim 
it. R.58[10]. Dang refused to return it until she paid the outstanding $4000-$5000 bill. 
Id. He told her that the van was in his back bay. Id. Blatnick called the police. IcL 
They ran the VIN on the van and established that the title was no longer in Blatnick's 
name as of March 1999. IcL 
Blatnick ultimately retrieved the van in March or April, 2001. R.58[33]. The van 
was heavily damaged. Id According to Blatnick, it had been wrecked a few times. IcL 
The console with the television and VCR were removed. IcL The carpets were 
"trashed." IcL The stereo and speakers were gone. IcL Most of the seat covers were 
missing. IdL The van was littered with garbage and it smelled of urine and vomit. 
R.58[35,38]. The van's ladder, tire guard, running boards, antenna and luggage rack 
were gone. R.5 8[3 8-39]. Blatnick testified that the van was in good condition when she 
left it with Dang, except for some body damage to the driver's side back panel and a 
missing headliner. R.58[31-32,35]. Blatnick filed a claim with her insurance company. 
R.58[l 1]. It determined that the van was totaled and paid her $5977.18 less her $100 
deductible. Id, 
Dang's version of the circumstances surrounding the van are different. He 
testified that Blatnick brought her van into his shop for some custom work and a paint 
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job in November, 1998. R.58[21]. Blatnick said that her insurance would cover the cost 
except for her deductible. Id. Dang made a list of things that needed repair, including 
rust spots, a broken seat, the electrical system, the carpeting, and the headliner. R.58[22]. 
Blatnick instructed him to make the repairs and said she would pay him at the end of the 
year when her husband received his bonus. IJL Dang gave her a written estimate of 
$2700. Id, He testified that that amount covered half of the costs and that, according to 
Blatnick, the insurance would cover the other half of the work plus the paint job. IcL 
Dang told Blatnick that KV, a business that he partially owned and that adjoined 
his own body shop, would do the paint job. R.58[23]. He took her there on a few 
occasions to see the progress on the van. Id. 
Blatnick called to pick up the van. IcL Dang told her to bring the money that she 
owed for the paint job and repairs. Id. Blatnick agreed. Id. When she arrived on 
December 24, 1998, Blatnick did not have the money with her and could not pay. 
R.58[24]. Blatnick called the police, who instructed Dang to let her take the van for 
$500 until they could work out their dispute over the final bill. IdL Blatnick gave Dang a 
check postdated 15 days. Id. They agreed she could bring the van back in January so 
that Dang could fix some paint drips on the van. R.58[25]. 
Blatnick returned the van in January, 1999. Id. Dang finished the touch-ups 
within two weeks. R.58[26]. He did not receive any additional payment from Blatnick. 
Id. She claimed that her insurance company would pay him $2791 less her $100 
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deductible. R.58[27]. Dang contacted her insurance company, which informed him that 
she had already been reimbursed for the repairs and paint job 30 days earlier. IcL_ In 
March or May of 1999, Dang transferred the title of the van to KV to cover the costs of 
Blatnick's repair bill. R.58[28]. The van sat in the backyard of Dangfs business until 
May, 2001, when the police recovered it. R.58[29-30]. 
Dang pled no contest to one count of attempted false evidence of title and 
registration. R.28. The State represented at his sentencing hearing that the theft charge 
was dropped with the understanding that he would pay restitution. R.58[19]. Neither the 
sentencing hearing transcript nor the plea statement specify the amount that Dang is 
supposed to pay or for what costs. 
At the sentencing hearing, Blatnick requested restitution for $674 in insurance 
premiums that she payed on the van while it was in Dangfs possession, $500 for the paint 
job, $201 for the headliner material that she purchased, plus the loss of the use of the van 
over the 27 month period. R.58[12]. The State represented to the court that Dang should 
reimburse the insurance company for $5977.81 for the amount it paid out to Blatnick, 
and $100 to Blatnick to cover her deductible. R.58[42]. The court ordered Dang to 
reimburse the insurance company $5977.81, and to reimburse Blatnick $1475, including 
$100 for her deductible, $500 for the paint job, $201 for the headliner, and $674 for the 
insurance premiums she paid while the van was in his possession. R.58[46]. All totaled, 
Dang was ordered to pay $7452.81 in restitution. R.39-43. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court exceeded its authority under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 
2001) when it imposed restitution upon Dang for damage caused to Blatnick's van after 
he transferred its title to another company. The restitution order is erroneous, first, 
because Dang neither pled nor admitted to the conduct that actually resulted in the 
damage to the van. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) & -(8)(a); State v. Galli. 967 
P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998). Moreover, he did not agree to pay the costs imposed as 
part of the plea bargain. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i). Finally, the restitution 
order is in error because the damage to the van did not bear a direct link to Dang's 
admitted conduct. See State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam). 
The mere act of transferring a title, which occurs on a daily basis without any damage to 
property, does not presume the extreme damage that the van ultimately sustained. 
Accordingly, the order exceeds the narrow bounds of the restitution statute, meriting 
remand and resentencing of this case. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 WHEN IT IMPOSED RESTITUTION 
UPON DANG FOR CONDUCT THAT HE NEITHER PLED NOR 
ADMITTED TO. AND WHICH BORE NO DIRECT LINK TO HIS 
ACTUAL CONDUCT. 
The trial court in the present case erroneously imposed restitution in the amount of 
$7452.81. R.39-43. A trial court exceeds its authority to impose restitution under Utah's 
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restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2001) ("restitution statute"), unless 
the order is based on conduct that the defendant pled or admitted to or based on costs that 
defendant agreed to pay, see State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998), and the 
costs that are directly related to such conduct. See State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273, 
987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam). 
The restitution statute directs courts to order restitution to cover any "pecuniary 
damages" that a person suffers as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). "'Pecuniary damages' means all special damages., but not 
general damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activity and 
includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(1 )(c). The statute further provides that, "[f]or purpose of determining 
restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the 
defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(a). "In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including . . 
the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction 
of property of a victim of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(b)(i). 
In support of its order below, the court addressed Dang, stating: 
I appreciate that you think [Blatnick] owes you $3500. You believe she 
didn't pay you, but I guess I don't get the connection between your belief 
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that that didn't happen and the action you took, which was to sign the title 
over to somebody else So that you have this, I guess this 
misunderstanding between the two of you, I don't see how it gives you the 
right to then say, well, I'll take the title and give it to somebody else. That's 
not the way it's done. And if you have been doing these things for 20 
years, I can't believe you haven't had that kind of difference between right 
and wrong presented to you. 
So, there's no question in my mind that this insurance company, for right 
or wrong, I guess you're saying she trashed it, left it with me for two years 
and stuck me with the bill. I mean, [] I guess that's possible, it's highly 
unlikely. But no question about it, the insurers had to pay her $5,977.81 to 
compensate her for what now is a useless van. 
So, you owe the insurer the $5,977.81. It's clear to me that you owe her 
a hundred dollar deductible. I don't see any reason why you shouldn't 
compensate her for the headliner that now cannot be used in that van. 
She also got a paint job on the van and because you were kind enough 
to hand that van off to somebody else, she doesn't get the value of the paint 
job. And I think it's uncontroverted that she insured the van during the 
period of time and paid a premium, had no use of the van because for 
whatever reason, it - you gave away her van. 
Now, on the issue that you wanted some compensation for not being 
able to use the van, I can't give her anything there because that would be 
just speculation. I don't have any value at all to assign to that loss, but 
everything else, there is value. And the deductible she paid, the headliner, 
the paint and the insurance amount to $1,475. When you add that to the 
$5,977.81, it's my judgment you owe a restitution of $7,452.81. 
These problems are directly linked to your failure to solve the problem 
between who owes who what on the paint job through legal channels and 
enjoy what you, I guess, consider your right, to engage in some sort of self 
help and go to the DMV and say, you know, they abandoned this car, 
they've gone to California, I'm going to now transfer the title. It's not the 
way the game is played. Now you have to pay for the damages that flow 
from that action. 
R.58[46-47]. 
The trial court's order is in error. First, Dang did not plead or admit to the conduct 
that forms the basis of the restitution order. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) &-
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(8)(a); see also State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998). The Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion in Galli is instructive here. In Galli. the trial court imposed restitution upon the 
defendant to cover the money forfeited by his family after they posted his bail and he 
absconded from the jurisdiction. Id. at 937. Citing § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i), the Galli Court 
vacated the order, reasoning that "Galli was neither charged nor convicted of bail 
jumping." IcL Moreover, Galli did not admit to bail jumping at sentencing. IcL_ The 
Court concluded that the restitution order was improper under § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). See 
Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
In light of Galli, Dang's restitution order is improper under § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) as 
well. Dang entered a plea of no contest to one count of attempted false evidence of title 
or registration.1 2 R.28-29. However, the attempted transfer of the van's title did not 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315 provides: 
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer to: 
(1) fraudulently use a false or fictitious name in an application for 
registration, a certificate of title, or for a duplicate certificate of 
title; 
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material fact 
in an application under this chapter; 
(3) otherwise commit a fraud in an application under this chapter; 
(4) alter with fraudulent intent a certificate of title, registration card, 
license plate, or permit issued by the division; 
(5) forge or counterfeit a document or license plate purporting to have 
been issued by the division; 
(6) alter, falsify, or forge an assignment upon a certificate of title; 
(7) hold or use a document or license plate under this chapter knowing it 
has been altered, forged, or falsified; and 
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cause the damage that ultimately resulted. Property titles are transferred many times each 
day, i.e. during the sale of a house or car, without any damage occurring to the property 
being transferred. Indeed, property is transferred daily in pristine condition without any 
sort of damage, let alone the extreme damage that Blatnick's van suffered in this case. 
Dang did not admit to the one count of theft that was originally charged, and 
which was the act most closely linked to the damage suffered by Blatnick. R.l. In fact, 
the theft charged was dismissed when an amended information was filed. R.26. In 
(8) file an application for a certificate of title providing false lien 
information, when the person named on the application as lienholder does 
not hold a valid security interest. 
The attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, provides: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
to be. 
2
 A plea to an inchoate attempt offense does not preclude imposition of restitution. 
See, e.g.. State v. GarnicL 619 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1980). 
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addition, Dang did not admit to theft of the van during sentencing. Rather, he only 
admitted that he transferred the title to KV to cover the costs of Blatnick's past due bill 
for the paint job that KV did. R.58[28]. Nothing in his testimony expressly or impliedly 
arises to an admission that he caused or participated in the acts that resulted in the 
damage to the van. See generally R.58. Moreover, neither the State nor the court sought 
any testimony from Dang that established that some act of his, beyond the mere transfer 
of title, caused the damage to the van. Id. Consequently, under Galli, the restitution 
order is erroneous. See 967 P.2d at 938. 
In addition, the order is erroneous because the restitution amount was not 
otherwise agreed upon in Dang's plea agreement. See.Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) (providing for an order of restitution where "defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement"). The State represented at the sentencing hearing 
that it agreed to drop the theft charge with the understanding that Dang would pay 
restitution and plead to attempted false evidence of title and registration. R.58[19]. 
Neither Dang nor his attorney made any statements at sentencing concerning restitution, 
let alone restitution that he agreed to pay as part of his plea agreement. See generally 
R.58. In fact, nothing in the sentencing transcript itemizes any damages that Dang 
agreed to pay. See generally R.58. The only evidence that came in as to damages is 
contested by Dang insofar as his responsibility for it. Id. 
Likewise, nothing in the written plea agreement sets forth damages that Dang 
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agreed to pay. R.28-29 (Written No Contest Plea) (Addendum C). In fact, the plea 
agreement is wholly silent as to restitution and merely states that "Count II," the theft 
charge, was dismissed. R.29. There is no qualifying language anywhere in the plea 
agreement stating that the theft charge was dismissed on condition that Dang agree to 
reimburse Blatnick for damages, let alone the damages that actually occurred to the van. 
R.28-29. The minute entry regarding the plea is similarly silent as to restitution, stating 
only that Dang "plead 'no contest.' State dismissed count 2 theft charge. State 
recommends AP&P PSR." R.26 (Minute Entry) (Addendum D). 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota in State v. Davis, 458 N.W.2d 812 (S.D. 
1990), reversed and remanded a restitution order where the pleadings in defendant's case 
were just as silent as to any agreed-upon restitution amounts as they are here. Id. at 813. 
In Davis, a company was, 
burglarized and approximately $3900 in guns, knives and jewelry were 
taken. A portion of the property was recovered at Davis' home, while other 
stolen property, valued at approximately $2386 [was] never recovered. 
Davis was charged with receiving stolen property. A plea agreement 
was reached and Davis pled guilty to receiving stolen property. Davis was 
aware, when he accepted the plea agreement, that restitution could be 
required but the probable amount of restitution was not discussed or agreed 
upon. 
IdL at 812. Although Davis was not charged with, nor did he admit to, the original 
burglary, he was ordered to pay $2893.59 in restitution for the unrecovered property. IdL 
In reversing the restitution order, the Davis Court looked to the South Dakota 
restitution statute and stated, 
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[i]t is clear that a defendant must plead guilty, be convicted of a crime, or 
admit to a crime before being ordered to pay restitution to the victims under 
SDCL chapter 23A-28. Davis was not convicted, did not plead guilty, and 
did not admit to the burglary of Black Hills Findings, Inc. Moreover, 
despite the state's contention on appeal, Davis did not agree to restitution 
for crimes he did not admit to committing.. . . 
While the trial court has broad discretion in sentencing, a sentence must 
be within the limits outlined by the statute. State v. Braun. 351 N.W.2d 
149 (S.D. 1984). The restitution requirement imposed on Davis was not 
authorized by the statute and is reversed. 
Davis, 458 N.W.2d at 813. 
As in Davis, Dang's restitution order is erroneous because he neither pled to nor 
admitted the crime of theft, and the restitution amount was not specified or agreed upon 
in the plea bargain. See supra. Indeed, nothing in the pleadings, but for the State's 
representation at the sentencing hearing, establishes that restitution was discussed, let 
alone settled upon. IdL Accordingly, the restitution order is not authorized under § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i). See also Davis. 458 N.W.2d at 812-13.3 
3
 The Nevada Supreme Court in Erickson v. State. 821 P.2d 1042 (Nev. 1991), 
adopted a rule requiring restitution amounts to be incorporated into plea agreements and 
to be agreed upon by the defendant. Id at 1043. "Such a rule embodies a fair reading of 
[the Nevada restitution statute] and avoids the manifest injustice of punishing defendants 
for charges to which they have neither admitted guilt nor been adjudicated guilty." Id 
The Court went further to note the "salutary effect of incorporating restitution into plea 
negotiations. For example,... the State could have offered to dismiss charges against 
Erickson in return for his consent to pay restitution to the victims of those charges." Id. at 
1043 n.3. A similar approach in Utah would have parallel benefits of ensuring just 
restitution awards and would encourage resolution of criminal cases in a manner that 
achieves rehabilitation and deterrence for defendants, as well as recompense to victims 
who might otherwise have only an expensive and burdensome civil remedy available to 
them. 
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Finally, the restitution order is erroneous because, contrary to the court's assertion 
below, the conduct that Dang admitted to bears no direct relation to the damages suffered 
by Blatnick. R.58[46]. Neither the State nor the trial court offered a basis in tort law 
supporting the restitution order. See, e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(c) & -(4)(a)(i) 
(authorizing restitution for "'[pecuniary damages,1" which are defined as "all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in 
a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal 
activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed"); see also State v. Twitchell 832 P.2d 866, 869-870 (Utah App. 
1992) (upholding restitution award based on conversion theory where defendant pled 
guilty to theft by deception of insurance payments). 
Instead, the trial court based its award on its non-specified conclusion that 
Blatnick's damages were "directly linked" to Dang's transfer of the title to the van. 
R.58[46]. The court overstepped its authority under § 76-3-201 in inferring that the 
damage to the van resulted from Dang's admitted conduct. See State v. Watson, 1999 
UT App 273, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam). Nothing in the court's findings establish how, 
exactly, Dang acted to actually damage the van. R58[46-47]. No evidence whatsoever 
establishes that he participated in the damage to the van, or even knew who did it. See 
generally R.58. The only conduct that was established at sentencing was that he 
transferred the title of the van to KV for payment for the paint job. R.58[28]. Mere 
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transfer of a title does not necessarily presume the extreme damage to the van, and 
neither the state nor the court set forth evidence that otherwise established that Dang 
participated in damaging the van. 
This Court in Watson reversed a restitution order that was based on such an 
overreaching leap between the facts admitted by the defendant and the losses suffered by 
the victims. Idatf[[5-6. The Watson case involved a murder. Id^at f^2. The defendant 
was charged with "criminal homicide and attempted criminal homicide because she 
allegedly drove [her] codefendants . . . to and from the crime scene. Watson was also 
charged with obstruction of justice for having sold the car used in the crime." I(L_ 
Watson pled to attempted obstruction of justice. IcL. Over her objection, she was ordered 
to pay restitution to the victimfs family to cover counseling costs. IcL The trial court 
reasoned that the restitution was appropriate under § 76-3-201 since there was a 
"'sufficient nexus1" between Watson's admitted offense and the counseling costs incurred 
by the murder victim's family. IcL at f4. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the 
facts she admitted at sentencing established a culpable state of mind sufficient to impose 
restitution upon her. Id. 
In reversing the restitution award, this Court rejected the trial court's conclusion 
that "Watson admitted responsibility for the murder and that there was a sufficient nexus 
to hold her accountable to the victim's family." IcL at «[[5. This Court specifically stated 
that the restitution statute was "more narrow" and did not allow for such a stretch 
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between the admitted conduct and the victims1 counseling costs vis-a-viz a speculative 
inference as to the defendant's state of mind. IcL "In other words, the statute requires 
that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, 
before the court can order restitution." Id. (citing State v. Voetberg, 781 P.2d 387 (Or. 
App. 1989)). Accordingly, this Court held that the trial court's inference arising from 
Watson's guilty plea to attempted obstruction of justice was not permissible under § 76-
3-201. UL at 1(5-6. 
The same rationale applies in the present case. Although Dang pled to attempted 
false evidence of title and registration, it is too great of an inferential leap under § 76-3-
201 to impute responsibility on him for the extreme damage to the van. Merely 
transferring a title to a vehicle does not mean that a person has the intent to see its 
wholesale destruction, as occurred in this case. Quite the contrary, it is counterintuitive 
to think that you might transfer a van that is in pretty good shape, having just been 
painted, for the purpose of satisfying a debt only to have the transferee damage the van 
so severely that it is totaled and rendered useless and valueless to them. If anything, a 
person in Dang's position would reasonably expect that the transferee would care for the 
van, even improve upon it, since it was the payment for services rendered. Indeed, titles 
to property are transferred daily without any damage occurring. 
For these reasons, the trial court's inferential leap between Dang's admitted 
conduct and the damages incurred by Blatnick exceeds the narrow scope of the 
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restitution statute. Indeed, it flies in the face of Watson to the extent that the trial court 
lost its focus on Dang's admitted conduct, and abdicated its responsibility under § 76-3-
201 to ensure that "responsibility for criminal conduct be established, much like a guilty 
plea." Watson, 987 P.2d at 1290. As noted by Watson, "'[because] such an admission 
can result in liability for substantial sums of money, defendant's responsibility for the 
criminal activities ought to be firmly established.'" IcL at 1291 (quoting State v. 
Voetberg, 781 P.2d 387, 389 (1989) (citation omitted)); see also Gordon v. State, 707 
S.W. 2d 626, 629-30 (Tx. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that it would be a denial of due 
process to order defendant to pay for costs associated with offense for which he was not 
criminally responsible). Yet, notwithstanding Watson, the trial court below imposed a 
significant amount of restitution upon Dang, $7452.81, without exercising its duty under 
§ 76-3-201 to ensure that Dang was actually responsible for the damages. R.58[46-47]. 
Consequently, the restitution order is in error. See Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at Tfif5-6. 
This situation is factually similar to that in State v. Lefthandbull, 758 P.2d 343 
(Or. 1988), where the defendant pled to attempted manufacture of a controlled substance, 
and was ordered to pay restitution for damages to the house where the manufacturing 
took place. IcL at 343.4 "The house in question was rented to and occupied by Sarah 
Henry, not by defendant. Henry admitted to manufacturing methamphetamine in the 
4
 This Court recognizes Oregon case law concerning restitution as instructive 
since Oregon's restitution statute "is the basis for, and substantially similar to Utah's 
restitution statute." See Twitchell, 832 P.2d at 869. 
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house. The pecuniary harm resulted from the manufacturing process." IdL. Lefthandbull 
was indicted on a charge of unlawfully manufacturing a controlled substance and pled to 
an attempt. Id at 343-44. Lefthandbull admitted that he was at the house "to fix the 
door" but claimed that he "knew nothing about methamphetamine." IcLat 344. His 
claims were corroborated by Henry. Id. Packets of methamphetamine were found on 
Lefthandbull's person upon arrest, and his fingerprints were found on pyrex dishes used 
in the manufacturing process. Id. 
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the restitution award for the costs of the 
damage to the house. Id. at 345. The Court first noted that Lefthandbull only pled to an 
attempt. It stated, "a person convicted of an attempt cannot be charged restitution as if he 
had been convicted of the completed crime unless the acts he admits or is proved to have 
committed caused the damage." Id (citing State .v Eastman/Kovach, 637 P.2d 609 (Or. 
1981)). The Court also noted that no particular acts were proved at a trial since 
Lefthandbull entered a plea. IdL at 344. Moreover, "no questions about what defendant 
actually did were asked or answered either at the plea proceeding or at the sentencing 
hearing." Id Rather, the court merely stated that defendant used the house for his 
criminal activity, "'and the result is that that property has substantially decreased in 
value.1" Id at 345 (quoting the trial court's findings regarding restitution). "The 
prosecutor or the court should have placed on record any evidence relied on to show that 
acts of defendant caused harm to the house, so that defendant might have the opportunity 
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to contest the causation issue." Id. (citation omitted). 
Dangfs case is similar to Lefthandbull and requires reversal of the restitution order 
for the same reasons. Without any admission from Dang, beyond the mere transfer of 
title, that he caused the damage to the van, without any specific questioning from either 
the court or the State as to his role in causing the damage, and without any evidence 
presented by the State that Dang inflicted the damage on the van, the trial court abused 
its discretion in imposing restitution. This is true despite the fact that Dang was 
connected to the van that incurred the damage vis-a-viz the transfer of title. See, e.g. 
Lefthandbull 758 P.2d at 344 (reversing restitution order for damage to house resulting 
from manufacture of methamphetamine although defendant was present in it at the same 
time damage occurred, was found with methamphetamine on him, his fingerprints were 
found on dishes used in process, and he pled to attempted manufacture of a controlled 
substance). As in Lefthandbull that act alone does not provide a sufficiently direct link 
to the ultimate damage to support the restitution order under § 76-3-201. Accordingly, 
the trial court exceeded its authority in imposing restitution for damages that were not 
sufficiently linked to Dang's conduct. See Lefthandbull 758 P.2d at 344. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Dang respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
restitution order and remand for resentencing. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this *£day of December, 2001. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TUONG XUAN DANG, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING/RESTITUTION HRG 
SENTENCE/ JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001200947 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Date: August 8, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: l i n d a v 
P r o s e c u t o r : WARNER, GREGORY M. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 24, 1961 
Audio 
Tape Number: 01-341 Tape Count: 420 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED FALSE EVIDENCE-TITLE/REGISTRATION/PLATES (amended) 
Class A Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 05/16/2001 No Contest 
HEARING 
COUNT: 520 
CHRISTIE BLATNICH SWORN AND TESTIFIES 
COUNT: 540 
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFT BY WITNESS. DEFT'S EXHIBITS 1, 2 AND 3 
MARKED, OFFERED AND RECEIVED. 
COUNT: 1340 
DEFT SWORN AND TESTIFIES ON OWN BEHALF 
EXHIBITS 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 15, 16, 21, 25 
EXHIBITS WITHDRAWN. 
COUNT: 2 960 
STATE CLOSING ARGUMENT 
COUNT: 3 070 
STATE MOTION TO ADMIT 
27 GRANTED. OTHER 
Case No: 001200947 
Date: Aug 08, 2001 
DEFT CLOSING STATEMENT 
COUNT: 3150 
STATE SPEAKS REGARDING SENTENCING 
COUNT: 3180 
DEFT STATEMENT REGARDING SENTENCING 
COUNT: 3200 
DEFT STATEMENT 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED FALSE 
EVIDENCE-TITLE/REGISTRATION/PLATES a Class A Misdemeanor, the 
defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $600.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $272.46 
Due: $600.00 
Total Fine: $600.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $272.46 
Total Principal Due: $600.00 
Plus Interest 
The fine is to be paid in full by 09/30/2002. 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
$100.00 PER MONTH BEGINNING 9/30/2001. ATTORNEY FEES AND 
RESTITUTION MUST BE PAID. FINE OF $600.00 MAY BE WORKED OFF 
THROUGH COMMUNITY SERVICE. PROBATION MAY NEED TO BE EXTENDED TO 
ACCOMMODATE FINE PAYMENTS. 
Case No: 001200947 
Date: Aug 08, 2001 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 86 hour(s) of community service. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $1475.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: CHRISTIE BLATNICK 
Restitution: Amount: $5977.81 
Pay in behalf of: CLAIM PD000981268-01 LIBERTY MUTUAL 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $200.00 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Murray District Court. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 600.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before September 30, 2002. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Pay fines and fees as agreed 
No Violations of the Law 
DEFENDANT MAY WORK OFF FINE THROUGH COMMUNITY SERVICE TO BE 
COMPLETED BY 2/20/2002. DEFT WILL TEACH VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE 
CLASSES. COURT APPROVED. REFERRAL GIVEN TO DEFT. 
COURT ORDERED RESTITUTION DUE IN AMOUNTS OF $5977.81 AND $1475.00. 
PAY TO COURT. 
Case No: 001200947 
Date: Aug 08, 2001 
COURT ORDERED DEFT PLACED ON PROBATION UNTIL PAID. PROBATION MAY 
NEED TO BE EXTENDED. 
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii; plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities'' means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c> "Pecuniary damages" means ail special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken* 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses 
(d> "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
ie> ii> "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suf-
fered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendants criminal 
activities. 
lii' "Victim" does not include any coparticipant m the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2* Within the hmits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an ofiense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them. 
(a; to pay a fine: 
ib» to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
to to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3) la) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii t dissolve a corporation; 
liii,> suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
tv> cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b> A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a> (i> When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant nas agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection l^(e). 
di) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)(c) and (4nd-. 
(iii) If the court iinds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order oi complete restitution as deiined ::i 
Subsection (3\bi on :he civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to eke parties. 
(iv; The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor che 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may. on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-. 
(v- If the defendant fails to obey i court order for payment >i 
restitution and -.he victim or department elects to pursue collection ot 
the order by jivil process. :he victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a 'ien <v!ien re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii,1 The Department of Corrections -'hall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to orincipal first and the 
remainder of payments credited ro interest m accordance with Title 
63. Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77. 
Chapter 30. Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may. in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection i4)<o. 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
<i; Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for ail losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
«iii i Complete restitution ana court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection «8». 
id) <i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a pare of the court record. 
i^iy In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment. 
the defendant shall oe entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(in) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded m a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money m a civil action 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution pavments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest m accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose the court 
shall order the defendant to pav restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was 
U) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges, 
(ID charged with a felony or a class A B or C misdemeanor, and 
(m) convicted of a crime 
(b) The court ma\ not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if anv of the following apply 
a) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction, or 
uii the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order 
(c) u) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5KaMi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule 
(A) S75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported, 
(B) S125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported, 
and 
(C) S250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported 
(ID The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actualh transported in a single trip 
(6) (a; If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle seventy unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officers report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted bv the prosecution or the defendant, and an> further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomv upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted bv the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall mclude any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including 
U) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense, 
(u) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law ot the place of treatment, 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapv and rehabili-
tation, and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim, and 
(in) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and 
ti) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant, 
(u) the abihtv of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court, 
(m) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment, and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim 
ADDENDUM C 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107 
fsJO CONT&ST 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ENTERING A QfcFHsFY PLEA 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I have received and read or had read to me a copy of the Information which states the crime(s) with 
which I am charged. I understand the charges against me. I have no questions about what I am accused 
of having done. 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTION RIGHTS 
Under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States I have the following rights: 
1) COUNSEL: I have the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge were 
to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to 
represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
2) PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Although I can choose to testify if I wish, I 
cannot be forced by anyone to take the witness stand and testify or give evidence against myself. 
That I choose not to testify cannot be held against me in court. 
3) CONFRONTATION AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF ACCUSERS: I have a right to see and 
hear in open court the witnesses who give evidence against me. I have, if I represent myself or my 
attorney has, in my behalf, the right to ask questions of those witnesses. I also have the right to 
have witnesses who will testify in my behalf subpoenaed or, in other words, called to court at 
government expense. 
4) JURY TRIAL: I can choose to have a jury hear the case against me. Any verdict rendered by a 
jury, whether it be guilty or not guilty must be by complete agreement of all jurors. 
5) PRESUMPTION AND PROOF: At trial I am presumed innocent until proven guilty. The burden 
of proving me guilty of the crime(s) charged is upon the prosecutor who must prove each and every 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
6) APPEAL: If I were to be tried and convicted of the crime(s) with which I am charged, I could 
appeal from any errors of law that may have resulted in my conviction. By law, an appeal must be 
taken within 30 days of entry of judgment. 
I understand each of these constitutional rights. They have been explained to me by the judge or a 
lawyer. I have no question about them. I know that I could plead not guilty and exercise all of the rights 
listed above. I understand that by entering a plea of w*y. I AM GIVING UP THESE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. ~ nocontebf-
/MO CONTEST 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A S«fCt**fcEA 
no ccntcsr 
I am admitting that I did commit the crime(s) to which I plead gwhjr. I convicted myself the same as if I were 
found guilty by judge or jury. Where more than one crime is involved, sentences may be imposed one after 
another, consecutively, or may run at die same time, concurrently. In sentencing me, die judge is not required to 
follow what any odier person recommends. The judge must impose sentence with the following limits: 
OFFENSE 
Class B Misdemeanor 
Class C Misdemeanor 
Infraction 
JAIL 
^ 365 days> 
0 -180 days 
0 • 90 days 
0 - days 
FINE 
<|6.00 - S2.500.6o> 
S0.00-51,000.00 
S0.00-S 750.00 
$0.00 -S 500.00 
PLUS MAXIMUM 
SS% SURCHARGE 
Certain crimes require added fees or odier conditions of sentencing. Most often, a maximum of 85% surcharge 
must be added. Some penalties for cenain crimes may be greater, or enhanced, if diere are other convictions for 
similar crimes. I understand these consequences and have no questions about them. I also understand that I have 30 
days from this entry of my plea today to move die court to withdraw the plea. It may not be withdrawn, once entered, 
without good legal reason to do so. 
NCC0NT55T 
ENTRY OF OOTPTY PLEA 
Of my own choice, I enter this plea. No force, promises, or threats have been made to get me to do it. I am not 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs or anything that would impair my judgement right now. I have read this 
document or had it read to me. I understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. By signing this 
document I am saying that I ENTER A PLEA OF 
'SSSfflP7 Attempt fotec Evidence, OF Title cund Peg istrati on 
Name of crime(s) and Class of chme(s) 
Statement of specific comprising elements of each offense and special terms if applicable (plea negotiation, 
no contest plea, etc.): 
Ma rnni-rst 
Oi^mgftrrf Count R 
•IP ** K }<* 
(Was I6.9CCI. 
ADDENDUM D 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
TUONG XUAN DANG, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Case No: 001200947 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Date: May 16, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: d e a n n a s 
P r o s e c u t o r : WARNER, GREGORY M. 
Defendant 
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : CLARK, KIMBERLY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date o f b i r t h : December 2 4 , 1961 
Audio 
Tape Number: 01-209 Tape Count: 5001 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED FALSE EVIDENCE-TITLE/REGISTRATION/PLATES (amended) -
Class A Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 05/16/2001 No Contest 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
HEARING 
Deft appearing with counsel. State Motioned to amend count l, F2 
amended to Attempted Title of Reg a class "A" misd. Deft plead "no 
contest" State dismissed count 2 theft charge. State recommends 
AP&P PSR. 
